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Abstract—Payment channel networks (PCN) are used in cryp-
tocurrencies to enhance the performance and scalability of off-
chain transactions. Except for opening and closing of a payment
channel, no other transaction requests accepted by a PCN are
recorded in the Blockchain. Only the parties which have opened
the channel will know the exact amount of fund left at a given
instant. In real scenarios, there might not exist a single path
which can enable transfer of high value payments. For such
cases, splitting up the transaction value across multiple paths is
a better approach. While there exists several approaches which
route transactions via several paths, such techniques are quite
inefficient, as the decision on the number of splits must be taken
at the initial phase of the routing algorithm (e.g., SpeedyMurmur
[42]).
Algorithms which do not consider the residual capacity of
each channel in the network are susceptible to failure. Other
approaches leak sensitive information, and are quite compu-
tationally expensive [28]. To the best of our knowledge, our
proposed scheme HushRelay is an efficient privacy preserving
routing algorithm, taking into account the funds left in each
channel, while splitting the transaction value across several
paths. Comparing the performance of our algorithm with existing
routing schemes on real instances (e.g., Ripple Network), we
observed that HushRelay attains a success ratio of 1, with an
execution time of 2.4 sec. However, SpeedyMurmur [42] attains
a success ratio of 0.98 and takes 4.74 sec when the number of
landmarks is 6. On testing our proposed routing algorithm on
the Lightning Network, a success ratio of 0.99 is observed, having
an execution time of 0.15 sec, which is 12 times smaller than the
time taken by SpeedyMurmur.
Index Terms—Payment Channel Network, Off-Chain Pay-
ments, Routing, Distributed Push-Relabel Algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin [32] have gained popularity
as an alternative method of payment. Blockchain, a crypto-
graphically secure, tamper proof ledger, forms the backbone
of such decentralized network, guaranteeing pseudonymity of
participant. The records stored in this distributed ledger can
be verified by anyone in the network. Consensus algorithms
like Proof-of-Work [32], [33], [8], Proof-of-Stake [24], [25])
are used for reaching agreement on state change in the ledger
across the network participants. However, computation time
taken by such consensus algorithm is the major bottleneck in
scalability of blockchain based transaction [11], [38]. To be
at par with traditional methods of payment like Visa, PayPal,
scaling blockchain transactions is an important concern which
needs to be addressed, without compromising on the privacy.
Several solutions like sharding [27], [17], alternate consen-
sus architecture [23], [31], [10], [35], [16], [36], side-chains
[7] have been proposed in Layer-one. But this requires revamp-
ing the trust assumptions of the base layer and changing the
codebase. A more modular approach is exploring scalability in
Layer-two [20]. It massively cuts down data processing on the
blockchain by running computations off-chain. The amount of
data storage on Layer-one is minimized. Taking transactions
off the base layer, while still anchored to it, would free up
processing resources to do other things. Also Layer-two relies
on Layer-one for security. Several solutions like [12], [13],
[27] have been proposed. Payment Channel [13] stands out as
a practically deployable answer to the scalability issue.
Any two users, with mutual consent, can open a payment
channel by locking their funds in a deposit. Users can perform
several off-chain payments between each other without record-
ing the same on blockchain. This is done by locally agreeing
on the new deposit balance, enforced cryptographically by
smart contracts [38], key based locking [30] etc. Whenever one
of the party wants to close the payment channel, it broadcasts
the transaction on blockchain with the final balance. None of
the parties can afford to cheat by claiming payment for an
older transaction. Opening of new payment channel between
parties which are not connected directly has its overhead where
funds get locked for a substantial amount of time. This can be
avoided by leveraging on the set of existing payment channels
for executing a transaction, proving beneficial in terms of
resource utilization. These set of payment channels form the
Payment Channel Network (PCN). Several problem such as
routing, security and interoperability needs to be addressed in
such a network.
The major challenge in designing any protocol for PCN
is to ensure privacy of payer and payee and hiding the
payment value transferred. No party, other than the payer
and payee, should get any information about the transaction.
Thus any routing algorithm designed for such a network
must be decentralized, where individual nodes take decision
based on the information received from its neighbourhood.
Several distributed routing algorithms exists but they suffer
from various disadvantages - Elias et al. [40] requires a
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single node to maintain list of active vertices for executing
push relabel algorithm on single source-sink pair, Flare [39]
requires intermediate users to reveal the current capacity of
their payment channels to the sender for computation of the
maximum possible value to be routed through a payment path,
Canal [46] entrusts a single node for computing maximum
flow in a graph. Landmark-based routing algorithms [28], [42]
decide the number of landmarks by trial and error. If the
total number of landmarks is k, then the payment value is
split into k microtransactions randomly without considering
the nature of the graph. Such a myopic approach for routing
each microtransaction may result in failure as it does not allow
optimal utilization of the available capacities present across
multiple paths.
It was first mentioned in Elias et al. [40] that push relabel
fits better as a routing algorithm for PCN because it proceeds
locally, taking into account the residual capacity of each
payment channel. However, the push relabel algorithm used
for single source-sink pair [40] is not decentralized in nature.
A distributed version of the same was implemented in their
paper for multiple source-sink pair but it is not well defined.
It is not clear how many payment transfer can be allowed
at a time through a channel. Further, it was assumed that
each payment value for a source-sink pair is unsplittable. This
assumption does not work in real life since the payment value
might be higher than the bottleneck capacity of a single path.
Deciding feasible routes even for a single payment transfer is
an involved process in a distributed network. This motivated us
to design a new routing algorithm for PCN which is privacy-
preserving, efficient as well as scalable.
A. Our Contributions
The following contributions have been made in this paper :
• We have proposed a privacy preserving distributed routing
algorithm, HushRelay, in payment channel network.
• We have implemented the scheme and its performance has
been compared with SpeedyMurmur [42] in terms of success
ratio and time taken to route (TTR) a payment. Testing was
done on real instances of Ripple Network and Lightning
Network 1 and it is observed that HushRelay attains a
success ratio of 1 in both the cases. However SpeedyMurmur
attained a maximum success ratio of 0.9815 and 0.907
respectively, when number of landmarks is 6. The time taken
to execute the routing algorithm in Ripple like Network and
Lightning Network are 2.4s and 0.15189s for HushRelay
but it takes 4.736s and 1.937s for SpeedyMurmur. These
statistics justify our claim of the algorithm being efficient
and scalable. The code is given in [1].
• The proposed routing algorithm is modular and it can
be combined with any other privacy preserving payment
protocol.
B. Organization
Section II discusses the state-of-the-art in PCN. Section
III gives a brief overview of the preliminaries. Section IV
1In the absence of widespread PCN, we use the statistics of such real
instances to create the network
defines the problem statement and Section V provides dis-
cusses HushRelay with Section V-A dealing with Generic Con-
struction and Section V-B providing the proof of correctness.
Performance analysis of each subprotocol of HushRelay has
been stated in Section VI and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A payment channel network is a peer-to-peer, path based
transaction (PBT) network, where each party operates inde-
pendent of other parties. Several P2P path-based transaction
networks such as such as the Lightning Network for Bitcoin
[38], the Raiden Network for Ethereum [4], SilentWhispers
[28], InterLedger [45], Atomic-swap [3], TeeChain [26] etc.
have been developed over the years. Perun [14] proposes a
more efficient network structure which is built around pay-
ment hubs. An extension of payment channel, State Channel
Network [15], not only supports off chain payment but allows
execution of complex smart contract. Spider network [44]
adheres to a packet-switched architecture for payment channel
network. Payment is split into several transaction units and
it is transmitted over time across different paths. However
the split does not take into account the bottleneck capacity
of each path which might lead to failure of payment. BlAnC
[34], a fully decentralized blockchain-based network, has been
proposed which transfers credit between a sender and receiver
on demand.
Till date, the routing algorithms proposed for payment
channel network are as follows : Canal [46] - uses a centralized
server for computing the path, Flare [39] - requires intermedi-
ate nodes to inform source node about their residual capacity,
SilentWhispers [28] - a distributed PBT network without
using any public ledger, SpeedyMurmur [42] - a privacy
preserving embedded based routing, extending Voute [41],
depending on presence of landmark nodes. SpeedyMurmur
is the most relevant privacy preserving distributed routing
algorithm. However, it makes use of repeated trials to figure
out a suitable split of the total transaction value across multiple
paths. Elias et al. [40] proposed an extended push relabel for
finding payment flow in the payment network. They are the
first to point out the flaw in assumption of considering trans-
action unsplittable for existing routing techniques. In real life,
splitting of fund across multiple path is inevitable since the
bottleneck capacity of a single path may be lower than the total
value of fund transfer. Later, a distributed approach for PCN
routing, CoinExpress [47], was proposed for finding routes that
fulfill payment with higher success ratio. A routing algorithm
based on swarm intelligence, ant colony optimization [19] has
been explored. Hoenisch et al. [21] proposed an adaptation
of an Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)-based
routing algorithm which supports different cryptocurrencies
allowing transactions across multiple blockchains. We observe
that none of the past works provide an efficient and secure
routing algorithm. It is either susceptible to leaking of sensitive
information or there exist a central entity controlling the
routing algorithm.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the required background on
payment channel network. The terms source/payer means
the sender node. Similarly, sink/payee/destination means the
receiver node and transaction means payment transfer.
A. Payment Channel Network
Definition 1: A Payment Channel Network (PCN) [29] is
defined as a bidirected graph G := (V,E), where V is the
set of accounts dealing with cryptocurrency and E is the set
of payment channels opened between a pair of accounts. A
PCN is defined with respect to a blockchain. Only opening
and closing of payment channel gets recorded on blockchain
apart from disputed transactions where settlement is done by
broadcasting the transaction on blockchain.
Basic operations of PCN [29]-
• openPaymentChannel(v1, v2, α, t,m) : For a given pair
of accounts v1, v2 ∈ V , channel capacity α (initial balance
escrowed), timeout value of t and processing fee charged m,
openPaymentChannel creates a new payment channel
(id(v1,v2), α, t,m) ∈ E, where id(v1,v2) is the channel
identifier, provided both v1 and v2 has authorized to do so
and the funds contributed by each of them sum up to value
α.
• closePaymentChannel(id(v1,v2), α˜) : Given
a channel identifier id(v1,v2) with balance α˜,
closePaymentChannel removes the channel from
G provided it is authorized to do so by both v1, v2 ∈ V .
The balance α˜ gets written on blockchain and this amount
is distributed between v1 and v2 as per the net balance
recorded.
• payVal(p(s, r), val) : p(s, r) denotes a path between
sender s and receiver r. It is defined by a set of identifiers
id(s,v1), id(v1,v2), . . . , id(vn,r), s, v1, v2, . . . , vn, r ∈ V , hav-
ing enough credit to allow transfer of val from s to r, if for
each payment channel denoted by id(vi,vi+1) has capacity
of at least β ≥ val′i, val′i = val + Σnj=i+1fee(vj), 0 ≤
i ≤ n, v0 = s and vn+1 = r, where fee(vj) is the
processing fee charged by each intermediate node vj in
p(s, r). A successful payVal operation leads to a decrease
of capacity of each payment channel id(vi,vi+1) by val
′
i. Else
the capacity of the channel remains unaltered.
B. Payment Flow problem
Consider a directed graph G := (V,E) : n = |V |,m =
|E|,m ≥ n − 1, having two distinguished vertices, source
s ∈ V , sink r ∈ V, s 6= r, as a flow network. For a pair of
vertices v, w, distance from v to w in graph G is defined by
dG(v, w), the minimum number of edges on the path from v to
w; if there is no path from v to w, dG(v, w) =∞. A positive
real-valued capacity c(v, w), defined by c : E → R, is the
amount of funds that can be transferred between two nodes
sharing an edge. For every edge (v, w) ∈ E ; if (v, w) 6∈ E,
then c(v, w) = 0. A flow f on G is a real-valued function on
vertex pairs satisfying the constraints [18], [37] :
f(v, w) ≤ c(v, w), ∀(v, w) ∈ V × V (capacity),
f(v, w) = −f(w, v), ∀(v, w) ∈ V × V (antisymmetry),
Σu∈V f(u, v) = 0 ∀v ∈ V − {s, r} (flow-conservation),
(1)
The net flow into the sink is given by f , where:
f = Σv∈V f(v, r) (2)
A payment channel network can be mapped to flow network
with channels forming the edges and funds locked on each
channel can be considered as the edge capacity. Finding the
maximum flow value from source to sink for a flow network is
termed as the Maximum Flow problem. In the context of PCN,
given a payment value val, one has to find a feasible flow
from payer to payee, which is termed here as Payment Flow
problem. Any max-flow algorithm with subtle modifications
can be applied here, taking into account the preflow f of each
vertex (except the source and sink) on the network. A preflow
is a real-valued function on a vertex pair which satisfies the
first two constraints of Eq. 1 and a weaker form of the third
constraint :
Σu∈V f(u, v) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V−{s, r} (non-negativity constraint),
(3)
A residual capacity of an edge (v, w) ∈ E is the amount of
capacity remaining after the preflow f , i.e. c(v, w)− f(v, w)
and it is denoted by rf (v, w). A residual graph Gf = (V,Ef )
for a preflow f is the graph whose vertex set is V and edge
set Ef is the set of residual edges (v, w) ∈ E : rf (v, w) > 0.
The flow excess e(v) of a vertex v is the net balance of funds
in node v denoted by Σu∈V f(u, v). The algorithm ends with
all vertices except s and r having zero excess flow. If sink is
unreachable or if the network does not have adequate capacity
for transferring the amount val, then the excess value is pushed
back to source s.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
It is not always possible to route the transaction across
a single path as the value may be quite high compared to
minimum capacity of the designated path. Hence it is better to
find set of paths such that the total amount to be transferred is
split across each such path. We define the problem as follows
-
Problem 1: Given a payment channel network G(V,E), a
transaction request (s, r, val) for a source-sink pair (s, r),
the objective is to find a set of paths p1, p2, . . . , pm for
transferring the fund from s to r such that p1 transfers val1,
p2 transfers val2, . . . , pm transfers valm : val = Σmi=1vali
without violating transaction level privacy i.e. neither the
sender nor the receiver of a particular transaction must be
identified as well as hiding the actual transaction value from
intermediate parties.
V. OUR PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION
In this section we provide a detailed overview of the routing
algorithm, HushRelay. The payment network comprises set of
payment channels denoted by channel identifier id(i,j), (i, j) ∈
E. We describe state the model and the assumptions made.
Network Model and its Assumptions
• The network is static i.e. no opening of new payment chan-
nel or closing of existing payment channel is considered.
• The topology of the network is known by any node in the
network since any opening or closing of channel is recorded
on the blockchain.
• Atmost one timelock contract is allowed to be established
on a payment channel at a time.
• Sender of a payment chooses set of paths to the receiver
according to her own criteria.
• The current value on each payment channel is not published
but instead kept locally by the users sharing a payment
channel.
• Pairs of users sharing a payment channel communicate
through secure and authenticated channels (such as TLS).
A. Generic Algorithm
Since we consider PCN as a flow network, for solving the
payment flow problem in the given network for executing a
transaction request (s, r, val), we propose a routing algorithm
inspired from distributed push relabel algorithm stated in [18],
[37]. The algorithm proceeds locally by exchange of messages
between neighbouring nodes. No single entity controls the flow
in the network.
Before discussing the algorithm, we briefly describe the
Push Relabel algorithm for a single source-sink pair (as stated
in [18]):
• The instruction push redirects the excess flow of a vertex
to the sink via its neighbouring vertices. The amount of
excess flow that can be pushed from a vertex v to one of
its neighbouring vertex w is δ = min(e(v), rf(v,w)), where
rf(v,w) is the residual capacity of edge (v, w). The value
δ is added to the preflow value f(v, w) (subtracted from
f(w, v)) and subtracted from e(v). Any push which results
in zero residual capacity of the edge is said to be saturating.
• A valid labeling function d : V → I+ ∪ {0,∞} is used for
estimating the distance of a vertex v from sink r. d(s) =
n, d(r) = 0 and d(v) ≤ d(w) + 1 for every residual edge
(v, w). The label d(v) < n forms the lower bound on the
actual distance from v to r in the residual graph Gf and
if d(v) ≥ n, then d(v) − n is a lower bound on the actual
distance from r in the residual graph.
• A relabeling operation is initiated when a vertex with excess
flow has a label less than or equal to that of the neighbouring
vertex. Once relabeling is done, it can initiate a push
operation. So one can think labels to denote the potential
level, where flow can occur from a region of higher potential
to a region of lower potential.
• A vertex v is defined as active v ∈ V − {s, r}, d(v) < ∞,
and e(v) > 0. The maximum-flow algorithm is initialized
with preflow value f , which is summation of the edge
capacities of all edges incident from the source vertex s
and rest all other edges have zero flow.
For our distributed algorithm, HushRelay, the basic op-
erations is Push and Relabel, with all the nodes acting as
individual processing unit in parallel. The network model
considered for payment channel network is asynchronous.
Synchronization across all the nodes is achieved via use of
acknowledgements [18]. A vertex v tries to push excess flow to
one of its neighbouring vertex w if and only if, as per the infor-
mation maintained by v, label d(v) = d(w)+1. It first sends a
request message with the information (v, δ, d(v), e(v)). Vertex
w can either accept the push by sending an acknowledgement
or it may reject it by sending a negative acknowledgement
(NAK). If d(v) = d(w) + 1, then w sends to v a message
of the form (accept, w, δ, d(w)) and v initiates the push.
Otherwise, if d(w) ≥ d(v) or d(v) < d(w) + 1, then it sends
a message (reject, w, δ, d(w)) where d(w) is the updated
distance label of w. A reject message will cause v to update the
value of d(w). When a distance label of the vertex increases,
it sends the information of new label to all its neighbouring
nodes.
As seen in Push Relabel algorithm [18], the label initially
set for source and sink node reveals the identity of payer
and payee. To obfuscate their identity from other intermediate
nodes in the network, we use a dummy source vertex s′ for
node s and a dummy sink vertex r′ for node r. Note that
the existence of dummy node is known only by the source
and sink. In the initialization phase of HushRelay, a directed
virtual edge from s′ to s and from r to r′ is established.
Since s′, r′ are virtual entities, introduction of edge (s′, s)
and (r, r′) is not recorded in the blockchain. The capacity is
initialized to c(s′, s) = val, c(r, r′) = val and the label is set
as d(s′) = n+ 2, d(s) = 0, d(r) = 0 and d(r′) = 0. The flow
f(s′, s) is set to val, f(r, r′) = 0, excess flow e(s) = val,
e(r) = e(r′) = 0. For all vertices v ∈ V − {s, r}, d(v) =
0, e(v) = 0, f(w, v) = 0, (w, v) ∈ E,w, v ∈ V − {s, r}. We
mention the procedure of Push, Push-request and Relabel for
a vertex in Procedure 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
The algorithm terminates when there are no active vertex
left (except the dummy source and dummy sink) in the graph.
The number of messages exchanged (for push request, push
accepted/NAK, height updation) is also bounded. The commu-
nication complexity, termination condition of the algorithm
and an upper bound on the d value of a node in the given
graph is stated in [37]. O(n2m) messages are exchanged in
the asynchronous implementation with O(n2) runtime. The
overhead lies in the interprocessor communication between a
vertex and its neighbours.
Example 1: Consider a network given in Fig. 1. Sender
S intends to make a payment of 15 units to receiver R.
Dummy vertices S′ and R′ is added to the network with
edges (S′, S) and (R,R′). The edge capacities are as follows
: c(S′, S) = 15, c(S,A) = 10, c(S,B) = 10, c(A,C) =
10, c(B,C) = 15, c(C,R) = 20 and c(R,R′) = 15. HushRe-
lay is implemented on the network to obtain a feasible flow
Procedure 1: Push(v,w,d)
Input : Active vertex v ∈ V, e(v) > 0, vertices
w : (v, w) ∈ E
1 if v 6= r′ and v 6= s′ then
2 Set find neighbour=0
3 while neighbour w of v :
e(v) > 0, rf (v, w) > 0 and d(w) < d(v) do
4 v generates a push of the value
δ = min(e(v), rf (v, w)
5 f(v, w) = f(v, w) + δ
6 e(v) = e(v)− δ
7 rf (v, w) = c(v, w)− f(v, w)
8 Send Push-request(w,v,f(v, w), δ) to node w
9 if NAK received then
10 Update information d(w)
11 f(v, w) = f(v, w)− δ
12 e(v) = e(v) + δ
13 rf (v, w) = c(v, w) + f(v, w)
14 end
15 else
16 Set find neighbour = 1
17 end
18 end
19 if find neighbour = 0 then
20 Call Relabel function.
21 end
22 end
Procedure 2: Push-request(v,w,f(w, v),δ)
Input : Active vertex w ∈ V, e(w) > 0, vertex
v : (w, v) ∈ E
1 if d(v) < d(w) then
2 rf (v, w) = f(w, v)
3 e(v) = e(v) + δ
4 if v 6= t′ and v 6= s′ then
5 send Push request to its neighbouring nodes.
6 end
7 Send push request accepted message to node w.
8 end
9 else
10 Send negative acknowledgement (NAK) message and
current value of d(v) to node w.
11 end
Procedure 3: Relabel(v,w,d)
Input : Active vertex v ∈ V, e(v) > 0, vertices
w : (v, w) ∈ E, rf (v, w) > 0, d(v) ≤ d(w)
1) Update d(v) = min(d(w), (v, w) ∈ E) + 1
2) Inform all the neighbours of vertex v about the updated
label d(v).
of value 15 from source node S to sink node R. The initial
state is given in Fig. 1 (a).
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(a) Initial state
In the initialization phase, each nodes is assigned a label
of 0 except dummy vertex S′ where d(S’) is the count of the
number of nodes (except S’) in the network. As given in Fig.
1 (b), S’ sends a push request of 15 units to S.
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(b) state
In Fig. 1 (c), S accepts the push request as d(S) < d(S′)
and an excess flow of 15 units is assigned to S. S changes its
label calling relabel function and changes d = 1. Now S sends
a push request of 10 units to A, bounded by the capacity of
payment channel SA.
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(c) state
In Fig. 1 (d), A accepts the push request as d(A) < d(S)
and gets an excess flow of 5 units. d(A) is changed to 1. S
still has an excess flow of 5. It sends a push request to B.
Simultaneously A sends a push request of 10 units to C. In
Fig. 1 (e), B accepts the push request as d(B) < d(S) and
has excess flow of 5 units. d(B) is changed to 1. Similarly C
accepts push request as d(C) < d(A) and has an excess flow
of 10 units. d(C) is changed to 1. B sends a push request to
C and C sends a push request to R. In Fig. 1 (f), upon receipt
of request from B, C finds that d(C) = d(B) and hence it
sends a NAK to B. R accepts the push request from C and
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(d) state
gets an excess flow of 10. It changes its label to d(R) = 1
and consequently, it sends a push request of 10 units to R’.
In Fig. 1 (g), B changes its label to d(B) = 2. R’ accepts the
push request.
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(e) state
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(g) Initial state
In Fig. 1 (h), B sends a push request of 5 units to C.
In Fig. 1 (i), C accepts the push request and changes it label
to 1. It sends a push request of 5 units to R.
In Fig. 1 (j), R finds that d(R) = d(C) and hence it sends
a NAK to C.
In Fig. 1 (k), C undergoes a relabeling operation and d(C)
is changed to 2. In Fig. 1 (l), C again sends a push request of
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(h) Initial state
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(i) Initial state
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(j) Initial state
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In Fig. 1 (m), R accepts the push request and it sends a push
request of 5 units to R’. In Fig. 1 (n), the algorithm terminates
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Fig. 1: Execution of HushRelay
B. Proof of correctness of the HushRelay
We state the following lemmas which justifies the correct-
ness of our routing algorithm.
Lemma 1: If val ≤ maximum flow in G, then s can
successfully transfer funds to r.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given that d˜ < maximum flow, let us
assume that transaction from s to r fails due to non existence
of sufficient capacity from sender to receiver. Now we execute
the distributed push relabel algorithm which will return the
maximum flow in the graph. Let us denote it by fm. But our
algorithm was able to find augmenting path for flow till d˜−γ,
where γ > 0 is an integral value, since our transaction failed.
If there exists no more augmenting paths, then fm = d˜ − γ,
which implies fm < d˜. This contradicts the fact that fm > d˜.
Hence our assumption was wrong.
Lemma 2: For v ∈ V \ {s′, t′}, e(v) = 0 on termination.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume that there exist one vertex vˆ ∈
V \{s′, t′} : e(vˆ) > 0 after termination. But since termination
condition has been reached, it means there vertex s is not
reachable from this vertex vˆ. Let set of vertices not reachable
from vˆ be denoted by V ′ and those reachable from vˆ be V−V ′.
e(v) = Σk∈V,(v,k)∈Ef(k, v)
= Σk∈V ′,(v,k)∈Ef(k, v) + Σk∈V−V ′,(v,k)∈Ef(k, v)
= Σk∈V ′,(v,k)∈Ef(k, v)
(∵ Σk∈V−V ′,(v,k)∈Ef(k, v) = 0,flow conservation constraint)
(4)
But since e(v) > 0, then Σk∈V ′,(v,k)∈Ef(k, v) > 0, which
means there still exists some augmenting path from s to v
(s ∈ V ′). Hence it contradicts the assumption of termination.
Lemma 3: For all edges (v, w) ∈ E, v, w ∈ V , f(v, w) ≤
c(v, w).
Proof of Lemma 3. In the algorithm Push, the flow value
δ for a given edge (v, w) ∈ E, the flow value f(v, w) from
vertex v to vertex w is decided by min(e(v), rf (v, w)). Since
rf (v, w) = c(v, w)−f(v, w), f(v, w) ≤ c(v, w) and e(v) ≤ d˜.
Flow value will be bounded by d˜, if d˜ < c(v, w) or c(v, w)
otherwise.
1) Propagating the flow information to source node: Each
edge e ∈ E involved in transfer of payment from source to
sink will generate temporary key ke for encrypting the flow
message to be propagated back to the source node. The sink
node, on termination, generates a key ksink as well some
random message rm, equivalent to size of the packet or its
multiple. Each such packet contains flow information which
is shared with a predecessor node. It constructs a message
m′ containing the information of identity of preceding vertex
w, the non negative flow fwv > 0 along with key kwv . It
encrypts the packet with ksink, E′ = Encksink(w, fwv, kwv),
and concatenates the randomly generated message rm with
the encrypted packet to construct message E′||rm. It shares
this information with w. If w is honest, it will construct a
similar message m′, for its neighbour say u containing the
identity of u, flow fuw, key kuw. It is encrypted with kwv
to get E′′. The encrypted message is concatenated with the
message received from its successor i.e. E′′||E′||rm. This
continues till all the packets reach the source vertex s. The sink
vertex shares ksink and set of randomly generated message
rm with source vertex s via secure communication channel. s
discards rm from the received message and starts decrypting,
beginning with the message encrypted by sink. On decryption,
it retrieves the flow information, identity of vertex and key
with which it will decrypt the next encrypted packet. All
duplicate information on flow is discarded and the remaining
one is used for reconstructing the flow across the network.
This is the routing information denoted by P .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF HushRelay
Experimental Setup: In this section, we define the
experimental setup. The code for HushRelay is available in [1].
System configuration used is : Intel Core i5-8250U
CPU, Kabylake GT2 octa core processor,
frequency 1.60 GHz, OS : Ubuntu-18.04.1 LTS (64
bit). The programming language used is C, compiler - gcc
version 5.4.0 20160609. The library igraph was used for
generating random graphs of size ranging from 50 to 25000,
based on Bara´basi-Albert model [6], [9]. Payment Channel
Network follows the scale free network where certain
nodes function as hub (like central banks), having higher
degree compared to other nodes [22]. For implementing
the cryptographic primitives, we use the library Libgcrypt,
version-1.8.4 [2], which is based on code from GnuPG.
Evaluation: Following metrics are used to compare the
performance of the routing algorithm, HushRelay with Speedy-
Murmur [42]
TABLE I: SpeedyMurmur vs HushRelay - Performance Analysis on Real Instances
Network/Algorithm
SpeedyMurmur HushRelay
Success Ratio Time taken Success
Ratio
Time
taken
Number of Landmarks Number of Landmarks
1 2 4 6 1 2 4 6
Ripple Network 0.38 0.7 0.92 0.98 1.66s 2.2s 3.23s 4.74s 1 2.4s
Lightning Network 0.42 0.65 0.83 0.91 0.61s 0.69s 0.83s 1.94s 0.99 0.15s
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Fig. 2: Analysis of HushRelay and SpeedyMurmur
• Success Ratio : It is the ratio of number of successful
payment to the total number of payment transfer request
submitted in an epoch.
• TTR (Time Taken to Route) : Given a payment transfer
request, it is the time taken from the start of routing protocol
till its completion (returning the set of feasible paths).
We allow just one trial (i.e. a = 1) of SpeedyMurmur since
HushRelay executes just once. The number of landmarks is
varied as 1,2,4 and 6.
• Real Instances - HushRelay and SpeedyMurmur has been
executed on real instances - Ripple Network [29], Lightning
Network [43]. The results are tabulated in Table I.
• Simulated Instances - The capacity of each payment channel
is set between 20 to 100 and each transaction value ranges
from 10 to 80. For each synthetic graph, we have executed
a set of 2000 transactions, with original state of the graph
being restored after a transaction gets successfully executed.
The source code for SpeedyMurmur is available in [5]. It
is written in Java and makes use of the graph analysis
tool GTNA2. From the graphs plotted in Fig. 2 a) and
b), it is seen that as the number of landmarks increases,
SpeedyMurmur gives better success ratio but at the cost of
delayed routing. On the other hand, our routing algorithm,
which is independent of any landmark, achieves a better
success ratio in less time.
From the results, we can infer that random splitting of capacity
without any knowledge of residual graph may lead to failure
in spite of presence of routes with the required capacity.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel privacy preserving
routing algorithm for payment channel network, HushRelay
suitable for simultaneous payment across multiple paths. From
the results, it was inferred that our proposed routing algorithm
outperforms landmark based routing algorithms in terms of
success ratio and the time taken to route. Currently all our
implementations assume that the network is static. In future,
we would like to extend our work for handling dynamic net-
works as well. Our algorithms have been defined with respect
to a transaction between a single payer and payee but it can
extended to handle multiple transaction by enforcing blocking
protocol or non blocking protocol to resolve deadlocks in
concurrent payments. [29].
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